Legal Arguments about Plausible Facts and Their Strategic Presentation by Jansen, Henrike
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 8
Jun 3rd, 9:00 AM - Jun 6th, 5:00 PM
Legal Arguments about Plausible Facts and Their
Strategic Presentation
Henrike Jansen
Leiden University
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been
accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact
scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
Henrike Jansen, "Legal Arguments about Plausible Facts and Their Strategic Presentation" ( June 3, 2009). OSSA Conference Archive.
Paper 81.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA8/papersandcommentaries/81
 
Jansen, H. (2009). Legal Arguments about Plausible Facts and Their Strategic Presentation. In: J. 
Ritola (Ed.), Argument Cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 09, CD-ROM (pp. 1-9), Windsor, 
ON: OSSA. 
Copyright © 2009, the author. 
 
Legal Arguments about Plausible Facts and Their Strategic 
Presentation  
 
HENRIKE JANSEN 
 
Faculty of Humanities, Dept. of Dutch Language and Culture 
Leiden University 
P.N. van Eyckhof 1 
2311 BV Leiden 
The Netherlands 
h.jansen@hum.leidenuniv.nl 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Arguments from plausibility, in which an appeal is made to customary behavior, are often 
used in the legal practice. For example: Joran van derSloot must have murdered Natalee Holloway, 
otherwise he would have called an ambulance when she looked dead. As in the example, such arguments 
are often presented with an explicit appeal to an inference license that gives the argument amodus 
tollensstructure [if he had not murdered her...]. I will address the question what motivates such a 
presentation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the requirements for the application of a legal rule is that the specific facts that the 
litigants appeal to have to be justified. However, it may be problematic to do so, since 
these facts often happened in the past and cannot be proven on the basis of direct 
evidence. As a consequence, the parties in a legal procedure have to resort to arguing the 
likelihood or, for that matter, the unlikelihood, of how things may have gone. As early as 
in classical Greece, writers of rhetorical manuals have described an argumentative 
technique that is of help in those situations, which they called eikos. With this technique 
an appeal is made to ‘imaginable behaviour,’ that is behaviour of which one can imagine 
that people display it when they are in a certain situation. For example: ‘It is likely that 
person X committed the crime, because he was in a situation that people do these kind of 
things.’ According to the classical handbook called Rhetoric to Alexander (1428 a 25 ff.), 
in an eikos argument three kinds of situations can be referred to in order to explain the 
imaginable behaviour: (1) the suspect’s emotions, (2) his habits, or (3) the profit that he 
would gain from the act. 
In the modern literature not much attention has been paid to this kind of argument, 
except for Walton, who calls it an ‘eikotic argument’ or ‘argument from plausibility’ 
(Walton 2002, pp. 17, 135), which latter terminology I will adopt in this paper. A reason 
for this lack of attention may be that these arguments are not warranted by a specific kind 
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of inference license that can be an addition to existing classifications of argumentation 
schemes, for example the pragma-dialectical division in causal, symptomatic and 
analogical argumentation schemes (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans 
2002, p. 95 ff.). The inference license in an argument from plausibility seems to be either 
of the causal or of the symptomatic type. According to Braet (2007, p. 73), in such an 
argument ‘a plausible causal or symptomatic generalization about human behaviour’ [my 
translation] is made. For that matter, elsewhere Braet (2004) only speaks of a causal 
generalisation, whereas Walton (2002) connects plausibility argumentation with the 
argument from sign (for instance pp. 107, 119, 326). 
Surely, we may not take the fact that arguments from plausibility are largely 
ignored in modern argumentation theory to imply that they are not in use anymore. The 
opposite is true, as can be deduced from Nivelle’s (2008) corpus of legal counterfactuals 
and a collection of examples that I have been building up myself. A modern example is 
one expressed by Natalee Holloway’s father, when he was asked to comment on the tapes 
presented by the Dutch crime journalist Peter R. de Vries:  
 
(1) Joran van der Sloot must have murdered Natalee Holloway, otherwise he 
would have called an ambulance when she looked dead. 
 
Like many arguments from plausibility, this one is presented with an explicit premise that 
gives the argument a modus tollens structure: Y (he must have murdered her), because if –
Y (otherwise: if he had not) then X (he would have called an ambulance), and –X (implicit 
premise: he did not call an ambulance), which is the same as: –P, because if P then Q, 
and –Q. In contrast, Natalee’s father could have chosen to present the argument in 
another way, such as: 
 
(2) Joran van der Sloot must have murdered Natalee Holloway, because he did 
not call an ambulance when she looked dead.  
 
In this presentation no appeal is made to an explicit inference license. If we want to 
characterize this presentation mode, it would rather be something like “making an explicit 
appeal to (Toulmin’s) data.” 
 In this paper the question will be addressed why an arguer would choose one way 
of presenting the argument from plausibility instead of another. I will call the way of 
presenting the argument the “presentation mode.”(For the background of this question see 
Jansen 2007a). I take it that rhetorical effectiveness is one of the considerations that play 
a role with regard to this choice. Therefore I will address this question from the pragma-
dialectical framework of strategic manoeuvring (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002), where 
this question concerns the presentational aspects of single argumentation in the 
argumentation stage of a critical discussion. The rhetorical aim of the protagonist in this 
stage of the discussion is to have his argumentation accepted. The assumption is that he 
can use presentational means in order to obtain this result.  
The method I have used for the research consists in (1) studying regularities 
among examples within one presentational class and in (2) reformulating examples of one 
presentation mode using another mode, in order to see whether this has consequences for 
the line of reasoning. For this purpose I made use of Nivelle’s corpus and my own 
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collection of examples—both collections containing instances of plausibility 
argumentation presented with an explicit inference license that gives the argument a 
modus tollens structure. I will show that with regard to the argument from plausibility the 
presentation that is likely to be more convincing is the one that suggests it to be a causal 
argument instead of a symptomatic one. Preliminary to the discussion of this issue I will 
provide a short overview of presentation modes and their characteristics, where I will also 
picture preceding research on the presentation of single argumentation that I have carried 
out. 
 
2. PRESENTATION MODES 
 
In the introduction two presentation modes of single argumentation have been briefly 
discussed: the presentation with an explicit inference license that gives the argument a 
modus tollens structure and a presentation in which the explicit premise consists in what 
Toulmin calls the data. The latter can actually be reconstructed as an argument with the 
formal structure of modus ponens. After all, the implicit argument that is to be 
reconstructed in such cases consists of an ‘if [data], then [standpoint]’-sentence (van 
Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans 2002, p. 57 ff.). The reconstructed 
argument then reads: 
 
(2) Joran van der Sloot must have murdered Natalee Holloway (Y), because 
he did not call an ambulance when she looked dead (–X), and 
(if he did not call an ambulance when she looked dead, he must have 
murdered her; if –X, then Y).  
(Y, because –X, and if –X, then Y = Q, because P, and if P then Q) 
 
Of course, the same argument can be reformulated with a presentation mode that has an 
explicit inference license and implicit data:  
 
(3) Joran van der Sloot must have murdered Natalee Holloway (Y), because 
for if he did not call an ambulance when she looked dead, that is the most 
likely option (if –X, then Y), and 
(he did not call an ambulance (–X).  
(Y, because if –X, then Y, and –X = Q, because if P then Q, and P) 
 
This presentation mode still conveys the modus ponens structure.  
The focus of this paper will be a comparison of the modus tollens presentation, as 
it is discussed in the introduction under example (1), versus the two presentation modes 
conveying a modus ponens structure, discussed above as (2) and (3).1 The differences 
between these three presentation modes boil down to: (a) whether the data or the 
inference license remains explicit, (b) whether the inference license contains a 
subjunctive mood (in the modus tollens presentation) or an indicative one (modus 
                                                 
1 Of course I am aware of the fact that presentation is a much broader concept, which can also include a 
presentation in which the standpoint remains implicit, or can extend to the specific stylistics of the 
standpoint and the explicit premise, such as contraction of the antecedent (“otherwise” or “then”). 
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ponens)2, and (c) in which order the information is presented in the inference license and 
whether or not the elements contain a negation. Difference (c) is caused by the fact that 
an inference license that gives an argument a modus tollens structure is the contrapositive 
of an inference license that gives it a modus ponens structure. Therefore their variables 
change places (being antecedent or consequent) and are each other’s negation: 
 
Inference license in modus ponens = inference license in modus tollens 
Y, because X, and if X then Y Y, because if –Y then –X, and X  
Y, because –X, and if –X then Y Y, because if –Y then X, and –X  
–Y, because X, and if X then –Y –Y, because if Y then –X, and X  
–Y, because –X, and if –X then –Y –Y, because if Y then X, and –X  
 
As for the presumed rhetorical effects of the characteristics of each mode, I have argued 
elsewhere (Jansen 2007c) that a subjunctive mood seems to do a better job in suggesting 
that the inference license belongs to common starting points. I have also argued that each 
mode has different effects with regard to the kind of argumentation scheme that is used in 
the argument. I hypothesised about these effects in the case of symptomatic 
argumentation based on a counterexample (Jansen 2007c) and analogical argumentation 
(Jansen 2007b, 2008). In this paper I will focus on the argumentation scheme as well, but 
now with regard to plausibility argumentation. I will show that the nature of the 
argumentation scheme expressed in an argument from plausibility seems to change along 
with a change in the argument structure from the one logical type to the other. This makes 
the third presentational difference, (c), between the three presentation modes sketched 
above, the central issue of this paper. However, concerning this third difference I only 
focus on the order of information presented in the inference license. The influence of 
negations is subject to further study.  
 
3. CAUSAL OR SYMPTOMATIC ARGUMENTATION? 
 
The different order of the information presented in the antecedent and the consequent of 
the inference license in either the presentation modes with a modus ponens structure or 
the mode with a modus tollens structure has an important presentational effect. This 
effect was found after rewriting instances of the presentation mode with a modus tollens 
structure (taken from Nivelle’s corpus and my own collection of examples) using the 
presentation mode with a modus ponens structure. It has turned out that whereas the 
presentation mode with a modus tollens structure gives an argument an air of causality, 
the presentation modes of modus ponens convey the impression of a symptomatic 
argument.  
The reason for a seemingly changing argumentation scheme has to do with a time 
difference between the state of affairs expressed in the antecedent and the one expressed 
in the consequent (see also Jansen, Dingemanse & Persoon forthcoming). In the 
presentation mode with a modus tollens structure the order of information presented in 
the inference license goes from earlier situation to later situation. The antecedent contains 
                                                 
2 A corpus study carried out by van Wijk (2008) shows that as for the modus tollens presentation an 
indicative mood used in both the antecedent and the consequent of the inference license only occurs in 
arguments based on a comparison.   
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a state of affairs that precedes—not only in the inference license but also in reality—the 
one that is referred to in the consequent. This temporal difference—how tiny it may be—
evokes the suggestion of causality, because it conveys the impression that the later event 
is caused by the earlier event. Illustrative is If Joran van der Sloot had not murdered 
Natalee Holloway, he would have called an ambulance when she looked dead. The 
argument suggests that if you are not guilty of a girl getting sick on the beach where you 
are alone with her, then the usual emotion would be to wanting the other person to get 
better. Customary behaviour in such a situation would be to calling an ambulance. The 
emotion is thus supposed to cause the action.3 
When arguments of the modus tollens presentation mode are reformulated as 
arguments with an inference license that makes them arguments with a modus ponens 
structure, the order of information presented in the antecedent and the consequent is 
reversed. As a consequence, this order goes from later event to earlier event, which gives 
the inference license an abductive structure, by which the cause is presented as having 
been deduced from the effect. When the argument about Joran van der Sloot is 
reformulated as an argument with the presentation mode with explicit data, it has an 
inference license with such an abductive structure. The standpoint expresses the cause 
(C),Joran van der Sloot must have murdered Natalee Holloway, and the explicit premise 
the (negated) effect, because he did not call an ambulance when she looked dead (–E). If 
we reconstruct the implicit premise that underlies this argument according to the ‘if 
[data], then [standpoint]’-structure, it gets an order from effect to cause: 
 
(4) If Joran van der Sloot did not call an ambulance when Natalee Holloway 
looked dead, he must have murdered her. (–E>C) 
 
An inference that goes from effect to cause is abductive in the sense that it explains 
afterwards (on the basis of the effect) how things might have gone (what probably has 
been the cause of the effect) (Walton 2002, p. 42 ff.).4 Since an abductive structure is 
non-iconic with regard to real-word-causality, it lacks the causal framework that is forced 
upon the reader or listener if this structure were iconic indeed (i.e. following the causal 
order in the real world). Therefore it rather gives the impression that the argument 
conveys a symptomatic relationship (see Walton 2002, p. 43, who calls an abductive 
argument an argument from sign). The situation referred to in the data is presented just as 
a sign, a symptom, an indication of the one presented in the standpoint. Such a 
presentation leaves open the possibility that the sign can be explained in another way or 
that other signs may warrant an opposite conclusion. An inference license that suggests 
causality is stronger,because it presents the situation that precedes the litigated action or 
lack of action as its cause. 
                                                 
3 With regard to the cause-effect presentation all the combinations with affirmed or negated causes and 
effects can occur (as I found both in Nivelle’s corpus and in my own collection of examples). That is: 
causes can be present and absent and effects can be present and absent: +cause > +effect, but also +cause 
> –effect, –cause > +effect and –cause > –effect. 
4 Note that I do not use ‘abduction’ in a logical sense, in which it refers to the reasoning structure If P, then 
Q, Q, so P. In pragma-dialectics, arguments with an implicit premise, as they most often occur in natural 
language (P, because Q), are analyzed as logically valid arguments. Therefore the implicit premise gets the 
order that makes the argument valid: If Q, then P.  
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 I do not claim here that when presented in the presentation mode with a modus 
tollens structure the examples are fundamentally causal arguments and that when they are 
presented with an inference license in modus ponens they are fundamentally 
symptomatic. Such an issue may often be hard to decide anyway, except for clear cut 
cases, such as a frozen pool resulting from a minus zero temperature. In other cases 
speakers and hearers may very well differ in their perceptions of causal relations in 
reality. This seems to hold specifically for the three grounds on which arguments from 
plausibility can be based. After all, it can rightly be questioned whether emotions, habits 
and profit really cause certain behaviour, since there is always human ratio that interferes. 
Obviously not everyone with a motive (profit) for committing a crime does really commit 
that crime.  
What I find interesting with regard to the issue of the argumentation schemes 
expressed in arguments from plausibility is that the presentation mode in which they are 
expressed influences their perception. First, this finding explains why Braet and Walton 
are not very sure and/or disagree with regard to classifying the argument from plausibility 
(as causal or symptomatic). Second, this finding may explain on the basis of which 
rhetorical motives a certain presentation mode has been chosen in a certain case. Given 
that a causal structure is more compelling than a symptomatic one, I am inclined to think 
that an arguer who manoeuvres strategically has to choose the presentation mode in 
which the inference license conveys the impression of causality. Only in clear-cut cases 
of apparent causality the presentation mode of the argument is of no importance, but 
those are not under discussion here.  
 
4. THE ROLE OF THE STANDPOINT  
 
Which conclusions can be drawn from the observation that an argument from plausibility 
seems to be a causal argument when it has the presentation mode with a modus tollens 
structure and a symptomatic argument when they are reformulated as arguments using a 
presentation mode with a modus ponens structure? The observation holds for any instance 
of plausibility argumentation in Nivelle’s corpus (30 items) and for any instance in my 
own collection of plausibility argumentation (34 items) (all items originally presented 
with a modus tollens structure). But can the findings of this little corpus study be 
generalized? That is: (a) can it be assumed that arguments from plausibility always 
convey a causal structure when they are presented with an explicit inference license that 
gives the argument a modus tollens structure? And (b) do these arguments always appear 
to be of the symptomatic type when they are presented with explicit data?  
I start with question (b), since it can easily be pointed out that the answer is 
negative. Consider the following argument:  
 
(5) Charles must have committed the murder (E), because he had a motive (C). 
 
The implicit premise of this argument must be reconstructed as: ‘Having a motive can 
make one commit a murder,’ which exhibits a causal ‘if C, then E’-structure. So, 
obviously, arguments presented with a modus ponens structure do not necessarily rest on 
an inference license that has an abductive structure and therefore seems to be of a 
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symptomatic nature. In order to obtain this answer, we only had to think of an example 
with a standpoint expressing the later event and the data the earlier one.  
Question (a), whether arguments from plausibility always convey a causal 
structure when they are presented with a modus tollens structure, can be solved in the 
same way. We should see whether it is possible to formulate an example in which the 
inference license exhibits an abductive structure. For this we also need to think of an 
example in which the standpoint expresses the later event. After all: since the antecedent 
of the inference license in such an argument repeats (in a negated way) the proposition of 
the standpoint, then the effect>cause-structure can be obtained. For this we only have to 
change the presentation mode of example (5). However, if we do so, the argumentation 
becomes nonsensical:  
 
(6) #Charles must have committed the murder, otherwise [if he had not 
committed the murder] he would not have had a motive. 
 
The argument now suggests that Charles committed the murder in order to get a motive, 
which is apparently not a line of reasoning that makes sense.  
Nonsensicality is not a phenomenon that coincidentally applies to the particular 
above example. It holds for any reformulation of arguments with a standpoint that refers 
to the later event. These can never be expressed in the presentation mode that gives the 
argument a modus tollens structure. Probably the preferable interpretation of an if…then-
clause is that from the antecedent the consequent follows, which clashes with the 
abductive order expressed in it. Undoubtedly the subjunctive mood also plays a role in 
making the above if…then-clause nonsensical. Evidence that supports this latter idea is 
that an indicative if…then-clause can express an abductive order: If the streets are wet, it 
must have rained (see also example (4)). However, the idea that the preferable 
interpretation of such a clause is indeed causal is shown by the need of the modal 
elements added to it. 
The presentational (im)possibilities of plausibility argumentation are represented 
schematically below: 
 
 
Standpoint contains earlier event Standpoint contains later event 
1. 
Presumably Joran murdered Natalee 
1. 
Charles has committed the murder 
 
1.1 
He did not call an 
ambulance 
SYMPTOMATIC 
 
1.1 
Otherwise he 
would have called 
an ambulance 
CAUSAL 
 
1.1 
He had a motive 
CAUSAL 
 
1.1 
#Otherwise he 
would not have had 
a motive 
Modus ponens Modus tollens Modus ponens Modus tollens 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper the presentation of an argument with an explicit inference license that gives 
it a modus tollens structure on the one hand was compared to the presentation modes with 
an inference license that gives the argument a modus ponens structure on the other hand. 
By reformulating instances of plausibility argumentation—ones that were originally 
presented in the first mode were rewritten by using the second mode—I have shown that 
when such an argument exhibits an inference license with a causal order in the first 
presentation, it exhibits an abductive order in the second. The reversed order may cause a 
different perception of the argumentation scheme.  
It has turned out that argumentation in which the standpoint expresses the later 
event cannot be presented with an explicit inference license that gives the argument a 
modus tollens structure. Therefore the issue with regard to the strategic choice for a 
presentation mode is only relevant when the standpoint contains the earlier event. It is my 
hypothesis that in those cases a presentation with an explicit inference license that gives 
the argument a modus tollens structure is the better choice. The reason is that in this way 
an argument from plausibility is presented as a causal one, and thus appears to be more 
compelling than when it is presented as a symptomatic argument.  
Of course, it is a provisional hypothesis that a presentation with an explicit 
inference license that gives the argument a modus tollens structure is strategically the best 
choice (as far as it concerns argumentation in which the standpoint expresses the later 
event). In order to test it, a more varied collection of examples is needed, including 
instances of plausibility argumentation that have a modus ponens structure. Studying 
those should give more insight in additional factors that influence the choice for a certain 
presentation of plausibility argumentation. Ultimately, if we want to test the empirical 
question as to whether a presentation with an explicit inference license that gives the 
argument a modus tollens structure is indeed favoured amongst arguers, a quantitative 
corpus based research has to be carried out. 
 
         Link to commentary 
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